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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900021-CA
Priority No. 2

ROBERT T. HASTON,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant Robert T. Haston relies on his opening
brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the statements of
jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts. Appellant Haston
responds to the State's answer to his opening brief as follows.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State and Appellant Robert Haston both agree that the
jury instructions should be construed as a whole though the State
requests this Court to disregard certain instructions because they
were allegedly not properly raised at trial.

However, Robert Haston

or the trial court, itself, referred to the instructions in such a
manner that the submitted issues are properly presented for appeal.
Alternatively, the circumstances of this case are
"extraordinary," since the jury instructions may have allowed a
criminal defendant to be convicted under a civil standard of proof.
The burden of proof is never made clear, especially in regards to
fully advising the jury on the appropriate elements of the crimes
charged and the proper burden on the affirmative defenses.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
IF THE COURT HAD GIVEN APPELLANT'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS. THERE WAS A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF
A MORE FAVORABLE RESULT FOR THE DEFENDANT
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief)
In Point I of its brief, the State argued that Robert
Haston failed to raise issues connected to his appeal of the
reasonable doubt instruction, Appellee's brief at 6-7, and that the
instruction, when construed as a whole, was proper. Appellee's brief
at 8-11.

Appellant Haston disagrees with the State's reading of the

transcript in regards to its first argument and then argues, in the
alternative, that the errors are "extraordinary" and subject to
correction.

In addition, Robert Haston concurs in principle with

the State's second argument (but not in its application) though he
submits that the instructions, when considered as a whole, further
support his position.

A.

ROBERT HASTON PROPERLY PRESERVED HIS ISSUES FOR APPEAL
In its brief, the State acknowledged Robert Haston's

objection to the reasonable doubt instruction and his cited
authority, State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989), and State v.
Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), Appellee's brief at 6-7, but
submitted that the instruction was not objected to on the basis of
its misstatement of law, its inadequate definition, and its
erroneous standard of proof.

Appellee's brief at 6.
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The State

misinterpreted Robert Haston's objection and its relationship to the
Ireland and Johnson decisions.
At trial, Robert Haston made his objection to the
reasonable doubt instruction in the following manner:
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, and I did have one other
exception, and that was to Instruction No. 7 which the
Court gave on the definition of — in part of beyond a
reasonable doubt, that standard. I also proposed an
instruction on that concept and took language directly
from the State v. Ireland and State v. Johnson cases
which are cases that came down from the Utah Supreme
Court earlier this year. Both of those cases
indicated that the previously used or generally used
reasonable doubt instruction did not accurately state
the law, and I took language directly from those cases
which I think describes clearly to a jury what that
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt means, and
object to the Court giving the instruction that I
think was the one that the Court itself proposed
rather than the one that I proposed.
(T 312-13) (emphasis added).
Appellant Haston objected to the "generally used"
instruction, a standard instruction "that the Court itself
proposed," by requesting the Court to include his proposed language
into the instruction.

Robert Haston sought to clarify the

misstatements of law, inadequate definitions, and inappropriate
standards of proof condemned by the two recent Utah Supreme Court
opinions.

In short, Appellant Haston referred to Johnson and

Ireland in an attempt to remedy "incorrect and perpetua[lly]
erroneous ideas about the meaning of the term 'beyond a reasonable
doubt' that is often insinuated into jury instructions."

State v.

Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Stewart, J., concurring, joined by

- 3

Durham and Zimmerman, J.J.); State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380
(Durham, J., joined by Howe and Zimmerman, J.J.) (acknowledging
Justice Stewart's dissenting criticisms of the language of the
instruction which "might, by implication, be understood to diminish
the prosecution's standard of proof").
The trial court also understood Robert Haston's objection,
referring to the "weighty language" criticized by Justice Stewart,
the analysis of what a "reasonable doubt in fact means," and the
"lesser standard" determination. (T 313-14).
preserved the issues on appeal.

Robert Haston properly

See also Appellant's opening brief

at 35-36 n.15.

B.

THE EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE
REQUIRE CORRECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR

Assuming, arguendo, that relevant issues were not raised at
trial, the extraordinary circumstances of this case require
correction of constitutional error. See, e.g.. State v. Turner, 736
P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987); cf. Appellant's opening brief, Point
I.D.

In Turner, this Court decided to address the unconstitutional

nature of jury instructions even though the defense counsel did not
raise the appropriate arguments at trial.

In his appeal, Appellant

Turner argued that the instructions created a presumption of guilt
which required him to prove his innocence.
agreed.

The Court of Appeals

Id at 1046.
Holding that the error was not harmless, the Turner Court

found that the instructions, when read as a whole, did not cure the
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fatal defects. Id. at 1044-45.

Even though " [t]he prosecutions

'burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of
the crimes charged7 was recited in Instructions 7 and 9, and
repeated in Instructions 10 and 11," id. at 1044 n. 1, the Court
nonetheless found that the "boilerplate explanations" did not
resolve the "constitutionally infirm" instructions.

"Language that

merely contradicts and does not explain a constitutionally infirm
instruction will not suffice to absolve the infirmity." Id. at 1045;
United States v. Pinknev, 551 F.2d 1241, 1246 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
("the prejudice caused a defendant by error does not somehow
evaporate or diminish simply because his counsel has failed to
object").
The error present in the case at bar is just as
compelling.

Before a criminal defendant may be convicted, the State

must prove each element of the crime charged against him beyond a
reasonable doubt.

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

If, as here,

the jury could have convicted Robert Haston under a lesser standard
of proof, his right to a fair trial was unconstitutionally
compromised.

General instructions do not necessarily cure specific

defects found in selected portions of the instructions.

See

generally Appellant's opening brief, Point I.B.
Another basis for considering the erroneous instructions is
the trial court's failure to properly instruct the jury.

As noted

by the State:
Accordingly, the judge may, over the objection of the
defendant's counsel, give any instruction that is in
proper form, states the law correctly, and does not

- 5 _

prejudice the defendant. However, all instructions
are subject to the general and overreaching rule that
the judge must make it clear to the jury that the
defendant has "no particular burden of proof but [is]
entitled to an acquittal if there [is] any basis in
the evidence from either side sufficient to create a
reasonable doubt that the defendant [is] guilty of the
offense.,f
Appellee's brief at 8 (citing State v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421, 428
(Utah 1980)) (citations omitted).
By negative implication, the converse of the Hansen
principles should also hold true. A judge may not, over defendants
objection, give any instruction that is in improper form, states the
law incorrectly, and does prejudice the defendant.

Similarly, a

judge errs in not making it clear to the jury that the defendant has
no particular burden of proof but is entitled to an acquittal if
there is any basis in the evidence from either side sufficient to
create a reasonable doubt.
The trial court in the case at bar did not properly
instruct the jury.

Besides rejecting Appellant Haston's

instruction, the court further prejudiced his rights by giving the
jury an inadequate instruction "that the Court itself proposed."
(T 313) ; cf. Appellant's opening brief, Point I.e.

Moreover, since

the contested instruction, Instruction No. 7, was an instruction
from the court, the judge was implicitedly warranting that the
language used, in its entirety, was proper.

See Hansen, 734 P.2d at

428 ("the judge may . . . give any instruction that is in proper
form, states the law correctly, and does not prejudice the
defendant").

Each sentence of the approved instruction is subject

to scrutiny.
- 6
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C.

THE LANGUAGE CHALLENGED BY APPELLANT HAS NEVER BEEN
SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED BY UTAH'S APPELLATE COURTS
In an effort to uphold the language of the contested

instruction, the State claims that a few of the sentences are
identical to sentences "approved" previously in State v. Tillman.
750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), and State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah
1989).

Appellee's brief at 10-11. Admittedly, some of the language

used in Tillman and Johnson actually mirror the language used in the
present case, but the focus of Tillman and Johnson was far different
from the emphasis here.
In State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), defendant
Tillman argued that his instruction "impermissibly shifted the
burden of proof in the guilt phase and the burden of persuasion in
the penalty phase to him." Id. at 573. The Utah Supreme Court
disagreed.

Agreeing unanimously in their decision concerning the

reasonable doubt instruction, the Court found that the reasonable
doubt instruction did not shift the burden of proof to the
defendant. Id. at 573.
By contrast, Appellant Haston argues,1 inter alia, that the
reasonable doubt instruction misstates the law and inadequately
defines the appropriate standard of proof.

He does not interpret

the reasonable doubt instruction in the same manner as the defendant
in Tillman.

See Appellant's opening brief, Point III.

1

Robert Haston's arguments pertaining to the
impermissible shift in the burden of proof emphasize different
instructions than the reasonable doubt instruction of State v.
Tillman. 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987). See Appellant's opening brief,
Point II & III. The defects of the other instructions merely
compound the inadequacies of the reasonable doubt instruction.
- 7
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The State's reading of Tillman has also been eviscerated by
the recent decision of State v. Ireland. 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989),
and State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989)•

According to the

State, because the language of the instruction used in Tillman was
"approved," the language of the instruction contested here should
also receive the same "approval."

Appellee's brief at 10-11.

Essentially, the State argues that the prior usage of portions of an
instruction validates its subsequent use.

Not only does the State's

argument ignore the context of the Tillman decision, it also
overlooks the fact that the "weighty affairs" language, though
seemingly "approved" of in Tillman, was subsequently disapproved of
two years later by State v. Ireland. 773 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Utah
1989), and State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989).
Consequently, the language previously "approved of" in
Tillman and Johnson may not necessarily withstand all future
challenges.

For the reasons stated on appeal, the challenged

language must be strickened or altered to conform with Appellant
Haston's proposed instruction.
brief, Point I.

See generally Appellant's opening

Had the jury received Robert Haston's jury

instructions, there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result for him at trial.

Johnson. 774 P.2d at 1146 n.16.

repetition or redundancy existed; Appellant Haston's jury
instruction fully and properly stated the law.

- 8
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No

D.

THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS, WHEN CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE,
COULD NOT CURE ITS UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEFECTS

While the State and Appellant Haston both agree that jury
instructions should be construed as a whole, Appellee's brief at
8-11; Appellant's opening brief at 36, the State nonetheless
requests this Court to disregard relevant challenges to the
instructions because "[t]o do so is inviting error,"

Appellee's

brief at 21. The State also takes exception to the "[evaluation of]
each instruction line by line to determine whether they, when read
in concert, satisfy the [appropriate] standard . . . ."

Appellee's

brief at 13.
Robert Haston's jury assumably followed each instruction
presented to them by the trial court.
12.

Appellant's opening brief at

The trial judge even advised the jury to interpret the

instructions themselves.

(T 303).

Hence, if the instructions, in

part or as a whole, were improper or subject to an unconstitutional
interpretation, the jury would be forced to follow their mandate.
Absent a complete recital of the arguments stated previously in his
opening brief, Robert Haston simply reemphasizes that the
prejudicial errors noted in the reasonable doubt instruction were
exacerbated by the impermissible burden shifting of the intoxication
instruction.

See Appellant's opening brief, Point I & III. The

depraved indifference instruction and its direct counterpart, the
Attempted Criminal Homocide instruction, also contained inadequate
deficiencies.

See Appellant's opening brief, Point II.
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POINT II
THE DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE STANDARD SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN "LIMITED" BY THE COURT
In its brief, the State acknowledged part of the directive
of State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988), which states "the
jury should be instructed that it must find 'that the conduct [of
defendant] evidenced an utter callousness and indifference toward
human life.,n

Appellee's brief at 14. The trial court, however,

deleted portions of Robert Haston's proposed instruction which
specifically referred to the language stated in the Standiford
directive.

See Appellant's opening brief, Point II.A.

The deleted

portion read:
In other words, there must be a knowing doing of an
uncalled for act in callous disregard of its likely
harmful effect which is so heinous as to be equivalent
to a "specific intent" to kill. Examples of this
might be unmitigated wickedness, extreme inhumanity or
acts of a high degree of wantoness.
(R 78) (emphasis added).
The State attempts to justify the court's deletions by
arguing that the eguivalent to a 'specific intent' to kill language
was not part of the Standiford directive.

Appellee's brief at 14.

Yet, the State also concedes the "the phrase in question was quoted
with approval in fState v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985)] and
Standiford" though it was not apparently incorporated into any
suggested jury instruction.

Appellee's brief at 14.

If, as the

State argued previously in the reasonable doubt instruction
discussion, a Court's prior "approval" of language validates its
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subsequent use, see Appellee's brief, Point I, the court improperly
excluded the "approved of" language proposed by Robert Haston.
On the other hand, if the "approved of" language should
have in fact been deleted, the court erred by deleting the entire
sentence instead of only the contested portion.

The Standiford

directive still required the inclusion of Haston's references to
"callous disregard."

See Appellant's opening brief at 27 (citing

State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 264 (Utah 1988)).

The deleted

portion of Appellant's first sentence may have appropriately read:
"In other words, there must be a knowing doing of an uncalled for
act in callous disregard of its likely harmful effect."

The trial

court failed to adhere to the Standiford directive.
The "explanatory portions" of Appellant's proposed
instruction, the two sentences deleted by the court, explained the
required elements of each crime.

The language of the deleted

sentences addressed the elements of mens rea and actus reus in a
complete and understandable manner.

The court's instruction,

though, did not properly address both elements.
opening brief at 28.

See Appellant's

If the jury had not been misinformed on the

applicable law, Robert Haston may have been acquitted or, at most,
been convicted of manslaughter.
Moreover, while the jury may have construed the examples
proposed by Robert Haston as "a highly subjective litany of general
evils," Appellee's brief at 14-15, at least such an interpretation
would have properly distinguished the "evil" conduct of attempted
second degree murder from the "reckless" conduct befitting

- 11 -

manslaughter.

Cf. Appellant's opening brief at 28-30 nn.10 & 13.

The legal principles of the court's instruction, (R 94), did not
convey the "evil" necessary to convict Appellant Haston of attempted
second degree murder.

If the jury had been advised that examples of

the appropriate culpable conduct were acts done with "unmitigated
wickedness, extreme inhumanity or . . . a high degree of
wantonness," they would not have convicted Robert Haston of
attempted second degree murder.

The shooting was not done in a

wicked or wanton manner.
As conceded by the State, Robert Haston and a few other
acquaintances "[spent] much of the day and a half prior to the
shooting drinking and unwinding at the Se Rancho Motel . . . ."
Appellee's brief at 4-5.

The State and Appellant Haston disagree on

the circumstances surrounding whether Haston "had[, earlier in the
day of the shooting,] been carrying the gun around fully loaded,
swinging it around and popping bullets in and out." Appellee's brief
at 5.

But even if these facts are true it buttresses Appellant's

position that he did not suddenly produce a gun and shoot a drinking
buddy because they had an argument.
In fact, Robert Haston already had the gun out before the
argument.

He was checking the "action," playing with it as he had

done in the past. (T 225). Nothing in the testimony of the expert
witness Oscar Hendriksen, a gunsmith, precludes the possibility that
Haston could have attempted to disarm the gun or check its action
with his hands near his body, as alluded to by Robert Haston, or
with his arms stretched out, as submitted by the State.
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Appellant's

opening brief at 5; Appellee's brief at 16.

In either case, a

drunken Robert Haston was unable to control the hammer from striking
the firing pin and the primer.

Appellant's opening brief at 6.

The

gun discharged, wounding Leonard Tate.
The State contends that "[w]hen [Leonard Tate] asserted
that [Robert Haston] did not have the nerve to shoot him, [Haston]
pulled the trigger."

Appellee's brief at 5.

Tate alleged that he

told Haston, "'I don't think you got enough guts to pull the
trigger.'

I said it a couple a times."

(T 145). However, another

witness for the State, David Ezzeddine, did not hear the sarcastic
"prompting," though he was close enough to hear the click of the
hammer when Haston was checking the action of the gun. (T 82, 112).
Ezzeddine "just didn't think [the argument] was going to escalate
into nothing or otherwise [he] would have tried to separate the
people up." (T 82).

The evidence was not overwhelming.

POINT III
THE PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS IMPROPERLY INFLUENCED THE JURY
The State properly cites State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39 (Utah
App. 1989), as the applicable authority for determining whether the
prosecutor's misstatements of law "were so objectionable as to merit
reversal."

Appellee's brief at 18. Admittedly, Robert Haston did

not specifically cite Lopez though his arguments nonetheless
encompassed both prongs of the Lopez test.
brief, Point III.
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See Appellant's opening

The State concedes that the prosecutor misstated the law,
"thus satisfying the first prong of the Lopez test."

Appellee's

brief at 20. The second prong was also satisfied because, as noted
previously, the prosecutor's misstatements "exacerbated the jury's
confusion over the already defective instructions."

Appellant's

opening brief at 35. The trial court specifically referred to the
other contested instructions, particularily Instruction Nos. 20 and
21, in its effort to "cure" the prosecutor's misstatements.
(T 310-11).

Instruction Nos. 20 and 21, the intoxication

instructions, should therefore be considered by this Court in
construing the jury instructions "as a whole."

Appellant's opening

brief at 36; Appellee's brief at 8; State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141
(Utah 1989).

The wording of Instruction Nos. 20 and 21 have a

direct bearing on the State's burden of proof and its relationship
to the reasonable doubt instruction.

See Appellant's opening brief,

Point I & III.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE IMPOSED RESTITUTION.
A FINE, ATTORNEY FEES. AND THE SURCHARGE
Robert Haston's financial status and his overall ability to
pay was never disputed during the sentencing proceeding.

Robert

Haston does not receive any money now and, at the time of
sentencing, received only social security checks.

The government

checks were minimal as evidenced by his affidavit of impecuniosity,
(R 126-27), and his need for representation by this office.
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He did

not have any funds remaining after selling his personal property.
Cf. State v. Snvder, 747 P.2d 417 (Utah 1987) (in contrast to Robert
Haston's indigent status, the court in Snyder ordered restitution
"in an amount not to exceed $500,000" for a defendant who had
dissipated $556,600 of an investment fund, had a personal net worth
of $200,000 at the time of his crime, was employed at the time of
trial, and had acquired substantial assets).

The trial court should

have found restitution to be "inappropriate" due to Robert Haston's
status but concluded instead that "to [not] order [restitution]
would be viewed as . . . some sort of condonation of the conduct of
Mr. Haston . . . ." (T 323).

No other reasons were stated.

court's actions and other conclusory comments were improper.
Appellant's opening brief, Point IV.
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The
See

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Haston respectfully
requests that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded to
the trial court for a new trial or dismissal.
SUBMITTED this

l(f

day of August, 1990.
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LISA J. REMAL
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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